This paper provides an explicit characterization of correlations implicitly captured by partition models for incomplete information games. The main result of this paper shows that every partition model for incomplete information can be decomposed as the conjunctions of a unique non-redundant...

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. The set of outcomes that can arise in equilibrium for some information structure is equal to the...

We consider a variant of the Tullock lottery contest. Each player's constant marginal cost of effort is drawn from a potentially different continuous distribution. In order to study the impact of incomplete information we compare three informational settings to each other: players are either...

In the theory of psychological games it is assumed that players preferences on material consequences depend on endogenous beliefs. Most of the applications of this theoretical framework assume that the psychological utility functions representing such preferences are common knowledge. But this...

This paper studies the inference of interaction effects, i.e., the impacts of players' actions on each other's payoffs, in discrete simultaneous games with incomplete information. We propose an easily implementable test for the signs of state-dependent interaction effects that does not require...

Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes...

This paper studies the design of trade policies in an uncertain third market with incomplete information. Governments in each of the two countries select either direct quantity controls or subsidies in an attempt to shift profits in favour of their own firms in an oligopolistic setting. It is...

I derive a refinement of sequential equilibria of a noncooperative bargaining game when one player has incomplete information about the time preference of the other player. I show that if the types for this latter player are drawn from some totally ordered and finite lattice, Grossman &...

In this paper, we investigate behavior in two-player sequential-move contests with complete and incomplete information about the value of the prize, theoretically and experimentally. First, we describe a Bayesian equilibrium of a sequential contest in which both players have private prize...

Networks can have an important effect on economic outcomes. Given the complexity of many of these networks, agents will generally not know their structure. We study the sensitivity of game-theoretic predictions to the specification of players' (common) prior on the network in a setting where...