This article considers an asymmetric contest with incomplete information. There are two types of players: informed and uninformed. Each player has a different ability to translate effort into performance in terms of the contest success function. While one player's type is known to both players,...

We survey selected results on strategic information transmission. We distinguish between "cheap talk" and "persuasion". In the latter model, the informed player's message set depends on his type. As a benchmark, we first assume that the informed player sends a single message to the decision...

In many economic situations, a player pursues coordination or anti-coordination with her neighbors on a network, but she also has intrinsic preferences among the available options. We here introduce a model which allows to analyze this issue by means of a simple framework in which players...

We prove that the structure theorem for rationalizability originally from Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) applies to any finite extensive-form game with perfect recall and suitably rich payoffs. We demonstrate that the ties induced by the extensive form do not change the result of Weinstein and...

This paper introduces games with a saddle function. A saddle function is a real valued function on the set of action profiles such that, for one player, minimizing the function implies choosing her best-response, and, for the other players, maximizing it implies choosing their best-responses. We...

This paper examines the social value of information in symmetric Bayesian games with quadratic payoff functions and normally distributed public and private signals. The main results identify necessary and sufficient conditions for welfare to increase with public or private information. Using the...

In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the structure of private information influences aggregate volatility. The maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic and...

We consider a non-cooperative sequential bargaining game with incomplete information where two players negotiate for mechanisms with ex post verifiable types at the interim stage. We prove the existence of a stationary sequential equilibrium of the bargaining game where the ex post Nash...

The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium which we dub Bayes...