This thesis advances game theory by formally analysing the implications of replacing some of its most stringent assumptions with alternatives that –at least in certain contexts– have received greater empirical support. Specifically, this thesis makes two distinct contributions in the field...

In this paper we try to replicate the simulation results reported by Axelrod (1986) in an influential paper on the evolution of social norms. Our study shows that Axelrod's results are not as reliable as one would desire. We can obtain the opposite results by running the model for longer, by...

The article describes how and why we failed to replicate main effects of a computational model that Michael Macy and Yoshimichi Sato published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (May 2002). The model is meant to answer a fundamental question about social life: Why, when and...

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Experimental studies show that the Nash equilibrium and its refinements are poor predictors of behavior in non-cooperative strategic games. Cooperation models, such as ERC and inequality aversion, yield superior predictions compared to the standard game theory predictions. However, those models...

The outcome of many social and economic interactions, such as stock-market transactions, is strongly determined by the predictions that agents make about the behavior of other individuals. Cognitive hierarchy theory provides a framework to model the consequences of forecasting accuracy that has...

"Institutional approaches to social dilemmas have so far focused on how to create incentive structures that channel individuals' behavior into socially desirable outcomes assuming that everyone is selfish. However, the presumption of universal selfishness is not only empirically invalid but may...