In this note, we extend the Goyal and Joshi's model of network of collaboration in oligopoly to multi-market situations …

We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D collaboration in a mixed … oligopoly. Our analysis reveals that the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable …

network is always pairwise stable and the partially connected network is stable if and only if spillovers are large enough. If … spillovers are small, the complete network is the efficient network; otherwise, the efficient network is the partially connected … network. Thus, a conflict between stability and efficiency may occur: efficient networks are pairwise stable, but the reverse …

We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D collaboration in a mixed … oligopoly. Our analysis reveals that the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable …

network is always pairwise stable and the partially connected network is stable if and only if spillovers are large enough. If … spillovers are small, the complete network is the efficient network; otherwise, the efficient network is the partially connected … network. Thus, a conflict between stability and efficiency may occur: efficient networks are pairwise stable, but the reverse …

network is always pairwise stable and the partially connected network is stable if and only if spillovers are large enough. If … spillovers are small, the complete network is the efficient network; otherwise, the efficient network is the partially connected … network. Thus, a conflict between stability and efficiency may occur: efficient networks are pairwise stable, but the reverse …