In this article, we consider firms competing in an imperfectly competitive international market. These firms are not all submitted to a pollution permit market. We show that a dominant firm being part of the pollution permit market can use it to obtain an advantage in the product market. This...

Protected areas are increasingly used as a tool to fight against deforestation. This paper presents new evidence on the spillover effects that occur in the decision to deforest and the creation of protected areas in local administrative entities in Brazilian Legal Amazon over the 2001-2011...

Permit markets lead polluting firms to purchase abatement goods from an eco-industry which is often concentrated. This paper studies the consequences of this sort of imperfectly competitive eco-industry on the equilibrium choices of the competitive polluting firms. It then characterizes the...

This paper discusses market power effects in ambient permit markets. We consider a dominant firm in a position to exert market power in several markets. A first conclusion is that the distortion observed on manipulated markets spreads to other markets. We find that the manipulated prices could...

This article examines the exclusionary manipulation effects of a pollution permit market. The exclusion value of a pollution permit and the overbuying strategy are determined. Then, the consequences of the exclusionary manipulation on the permit price are given. We give some economic policy...

Cet article traite de l’exclusion par manipulation des marchés de permis d’émission. Dans un premier temps, nous déterminons la va- leur de l’exclusion contenue dans le permis. Puis, nous définissons la stratégie de sur-achat des permis et évaluons son impact sur le prix du permis....

This paper investigates if pollution permit markets are harmful for employment within a Wage Setting-Price Setting (WS-PS) model. The employment level is determined according to several financing unemployment benefits: a wage tax or the revenue of the pollution permit auction. We first show that...