A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the opportunity to influence the rules of the game before they...

Voters whose yes-or-no decision never makes a difference to the outcome in a simple voting game are known as “null players”. Luxembourg’s role in the Council of Ministers during the first period of the European Economic Community (EEC) is often cited as a real-world case. The paper...

We s tudy minimum cost spanning tree problems for a given set of users connected to a source. We propose a rule of sharing such that each user may pay her cost for such a tree plus an additional amount to the others users . A reduction of her cost appears as a compensation from the other users....

In this paper, different merge proof notions for allocation rules at transferable utility games are defined and studied. Merging of a coalition into a single player is considered mainly in two different ways: firstly, merging of only one coalition -where the other (external) players stay as...

The application of game theory and cognitive economy to analyze the problem of undesired location - The analysts of the processes of public bodies decision - taking have long been discussing on the establishment of proper strategies to manage "environmental conflicts" - above all the so-called...

We provide a new equilibrium-refinement (a generalization of the Intuitive Criterion) for dynamic incomplete information games. We discuss the properties of this refinement in a class of games that includes sender-receiver games. We also provide applications (certain incomplete information games...

EU declares to provide support for the rural and poor regions of its member states. However, recent research shows that past EU budget allocations (in EU-15) can be attributed to measures of the distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers deciding on the bulk of EU spending. A...

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining...

Two well-known single valued solutions for TU-games are the Shapley value and Solidarity value, which verify three properties: Linearity, Symmetry and Efficiency, and the null player axiom. On the other hand, the interpretation of the two values is usually related on the marginal contribution of...

We argue that heroism is typically adaptive everyday ethical behavior taken to the extreme by over-generalization. We discuss three types of ethical principles with the properties of being cooperative, adaptive in the context of everyday life, but not in one's self-interest when taken to the...