Social comparison theories typically assume a comparable degree of competition between commensurate rivals on a mutually important dimension. In contrast, however, the following set of studies reveals that the degree of competition between such rivals depends on their proximity to a standard....

Substantial evidence suggests that group diversity can generate a multiplier effect that significantly affects the public good produced in collective action. In this paper, we examine how such a multiplier effect impacts group formation or the matching of diverse agents. Our model shows that...

Unfair deals, which are prevalent, do not serve the interests of the harmed party to a deal nor society more generally. This article proposes a theory — here coined ‘deal theory’ — to explain ‘dealor’ behaviours and motivations for offering unfair deals. The theory builds on insights...

The paper explores the Nash’ equilibrium point and the “Non Cooperative Games Theory” for extension of bargaining solution analyses, applied in the local development field. Social trust and social cohesion conditions (sensitization process) within the Community develop the necessity of...

We live in a coordination economy. As one surveys the myriad challenges of modern social and economic life, an ever increasing proportion is defined not by the need to reconcile competing interests, but by the challenge of getting everyone on the same page. Conflict is not absent in these...

The purpose of this article is to outline important developments in the European Union decision-making after the eastern enlargement and to draw attention to their likely implications, especially to the threats they may pose to the functioning and democratic quality of the European polity....

The transition of the »Old Communist« countries of East and Central Europe has been disappointingly slow given the amount of physical and human capital available at the start of the <p> transition. We argue that this slowness is caused by the lack of social capital, which is an <p> important factor...</p></p>

The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are made compatible with the framework of the theory of implementation. This is done through a reinterpretation of the characteristic function that avoids feasibility problems, thereby allowing an analysis that focuses exclusively on the...

We investigate the implications of converse consistency in the context of bargaining. A solution is conversely consistent if whenever for some problem, a feasible alternative has the property that for all proper subgroups of the agents it involves, the solution chooses the restriction of the...

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a game in strategic form. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the "proposer commitment" procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash's two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the...