We investigate a pure exchange atomless economy under uncertainty with emphasis on an epistemic point of view, where the traders are assumed to have a non-partitional information structure. We propose a generalized notion of rational expectations equilibrium for the economy and we show the core...

The purpose of this article is to investigate epistemic conditions for a sequential equilibrium in an extensive form game with imperfect information: If players mutually know that all players maximize their own expected payoffs at any information sets in their final decisions then their...

Let us consider a pure exchange economy under non-partitional information where the traders are assumed to have a reflexive and transitive information structure and to have strictly monotone preferences. We show the no speculation theorem: If the initial endowment is ex-ante Pareto optimal then...

This paper presents the communication process of passionate belief messages according to a protocol, and then to show that, by communication among players, the posteriors for a given event must be equal among them even if they have asymmetric information. In our setting, the players may send...