Let us consider a pure exchange economy under non-partitional information where the traders are assumed to have a reflexive and transitive information structure and to have strictly monotone preferences. We show the no speculation theorem: If the initial endowment is ex-ante Pareto optimal then...

We investigate a pure exchange atomless economy under uncertainty with emphasis on an epistemic point of view, where the traders are assumed to have a non-partitional information structure. We propose a generalized notion of rational expectations equilibrium for the economy and we show the core...

In an exchange economy under uncertainty with two periods, one physical good, and finitely many states of the world, we show that for every (complete or incomplete) market span there exists a sequence of securities such that if they are introduced into markets one by one, the prices of any...

Following LeRoy and Werner (2001), we propose a definition of effectively complete asset markets in a model with multiple goods and multiple periods, and establish the first and second welfare theorems in such markets. As applications of the first welfare theorem, we derive the sunspot...

This introduces the symposium on general equilibrium.

In an exchange economy under uncertainty with two periods, one physical good, and finitely many states of the world, we show that for every (complete or incomplete) market span there exists a sequence of securities such that if they are introduced into markets one by one, the prices of any...

We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly affect equilibria in a model of matching in trading networks. Our model incorporates distortionary frictions such as transaction taxes, bargaining costs, and incomplete markets. When contracts are fully substitutable for firms, competitive...

We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly affect equilibria in a model of matching in trading networks. Our model incorporates distortionary frictions such as transaction taxes, bargaining costs, and incomplete markets. When contracts are fully substitutable for firms, competitive...

We discover that letting agents pairwise sequentially exchange at "wrong" prices has a robust effect on prices at convergence. If the initial relative price for a good is cheaper than the equilibrium walrasian price due to initial endowments, the initial excess demand effect pushes resource...

I study a model where people can be matched in fractions. That is to say, whether a pair is matched is not a binary matter. They can be matched with some intensity. Each has a fixed availability: the total intensity with which he is matched to his partners. I propose a notion of competitive...