In the absence of contrary information, it would seem prudent for competitors to attribute to their opposition the same level of rationality they attribute to themselves. Using a simple but interesting C^3 (command, control, and communication) problem for illustration, a method is proposed for...

This study reports on extensive computer experiments for the "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners (IPD/CR)" framework. For example, it is shown that the introduction of choice and refusal tends to enhance the emergence of cooperation in IPD games in comparison to...

This essay is an invited comment on Philip Mirowski's essay titled "Markets Come to Bits: Evolution, Computation, and Markomata in Economic Science," also to appear in JEBO. In his usual brilliant and provocative style, Mirowski argues for a constructive approach to economic modeling centered on...

A method is proposed for the sequential updating of criterion functions on the basis of past reward observations in analogy to Bayes' rule for the updating of probability distribution functions. 

Using the Lefschetz fixed point theorem, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence theorem is established for a class of n-person games with possibly nonacyclic strategy sets. It is argued that the Lefschetz approach to fixed point theorems may ultimately prove to be particularly important in...

abstracted in Zentralblatt fur Mathematik, August 1985, p. 410 This article presents a generalization of the standard N-person game with flexible information requirements suitable for players constrained by certain types of bounded rationality. In particular, strategies (complete contingency...

This study uses the Flexible Least Squares method for Time-Varying Linear Regression (FLS-TVLR) to investigate coefficient stability for the Goldfeld U.S. money demand model over the volatile period 1959:Q2 to 1985:Q3. The only constraint imposed on coefficient variation over time is a...

Since optimal investment strategies generally cannot be obtained in closed form when consumers exhibit non-constant risk aversion, many dynamic investment studies have focused on the constant risk aversion case. This study considers a general class of dynamic investment models in which agents...

Agent-based computational economics (ACE) is the computational study of economies modeled as dynamic systems of interacting agents. Thus, ACE is a specialization to economics of the basic complex adaptive systems paradigm. This paper outlines the main objectives and defining characteristics of...

Why does the First Welfare Theorem fail in standard overlapping generations economies with production, such as Diamond (AER, 1965) and Tirole (Econometrica, 1985)? This study argues that the reason for this failure can be attributed to the passive intermediation role played by the Walrasian...