problem to design a contract that provides an expert with incentives to acquire and reveal information. We show that it is in … precision of his information. We extend the model to analyze contracting with multiple experts, the timing of expertise, and the … provision of incentives when the realized state is not verifiable …

Supervisory monitoring and monetary incentives are often used concurrently to mitigate agency conflicts. When an agent … optimal level, a conflicting interaction effect arises because monitoring reduces the marginal impact of monetary incentives …

-powered incentives in the optimal contract. Secondly, complementing Itoh's findings, we conclude that even if there are no productive …

engages in both acquiring additional information and implementing the project. We show that the implementer's incentives to …

Employees often learn about their ability while working, and the resulting beliefs interact with pay incentives to … job, dynamic selection, effort, and variation in pay incentives. The empirical analysis is based on unique data from a US … which pay incentives affect employment outcomes, profits, and compensation. Under the implemented and the profit …

This paper examines the optimal provision of incentives for contract designers. A principal hires an agent to draft a …

This paper combines theories of communication with theories of expertise and teams. Facing a team of experts, who must … be given incentives to acquire information and to communicate it truthfully, how can and how should the leader …

. I study the optimal design of contracts, focusing on the organization of expertise in the communication phase. I show …