We use the Shapley value and the nucleolus to analyze the impact of three controversial pipeline projects on the power structure in the Eurasian trade of natural gas. Two pipelines, `Nord Stream' and `South Stream', allow Russian gas to bypass transit countries, Ukraine and Belarus. The third...

A cooperative game theoretic framework is introduced to study the behavior of cooperating and competing electrical energy providers considering price-preference rational consumers. We analyze the interactions of generators in an idealized environment described by a DC load flow model where the...

In late 2005, the German energy companies E.ON and Wintershall and Russian Gazprom reached an agreement to build a new huge pipeline Nord Stream through the Baltic Sea. This pipeline will provide Russia for the first time ever with the direct access to its Western European customers. This...

Ende 2005 vereinbarten die deutschen Energieunternehmen E.ON und Wintershall gemeinsam mit der russischen Gazprom eine neue Pipeline "Nord-Stream" zu bauen, mit der russisches Erdgas erstmalig direkt durch die Ostsee nach Deutschland geliefert werden kann. Diese Pipeline erhöht die Sicherheit...

We develop a dynamic model of strategic investment in a transnational pipeline system. In the absence of international contract enforcement, countries may distort investment in order to increase their bargaining power, resulting in overinvestment in expensive and underinvestment in cheap...

Russian natural gas is delivered to Western Europe by pipelines, running throughUkraine, Poland and other transit countries. We derive the bargaining power of thedifferent players along this supply chain endogenously from the architecture of thetransmission system and its possible extensions by...

We propose a variant of the incomplete contract framework to analyze strategicinvestment in international transport networks, where investment is observable andsome, but not all, players cannot make long-term commitments regarding accessto their transport infrastructure. Those players who can...

We analyze how investment into the pipeline system supplying Russian natural gas to WesternEurope is distorted for strategic reasons. We use a two stage multilateral bargaining game amongheterogenous players, some lacking the ability to make long-term commitments. At the first stagethe players...

We develop a dynamic model of strategic investment in a transnational pipeline system. In the absence of international contract enforcement, countries may distort investment in order to increase their bargaining power, resulting in overinvestment in expensive and underinvestment in cheap...

We develop a dynamic model of strategic investment in the Eurasian transport system fornatural gas. In the absence of international contract enforcement, countries may distortinvestment in order to increase their bargaining power, resulting in underinvestment incheap and/or overinvestment in...