A mechanism guarantees a certain welfare level to its agents, if each of them can secure that level against unanimously adversarial others. How high can such a guarantee be, and what type of mechanism achieves it? In the n-person probabilistic voting/bargaining model with p deterministic...

Theorem 1 in Bhargava, Mohit et al. (2015) provides a necessary condition for a social choice function to be LOBIC with respect to a belief system satisfying top-set (TS) correlation. In this paper, we provide a counter example to that theorem and consequently provide a new necessary condition...

In this paper, we study intertemporal social welfare evaluations when agents have heterogeneous time preferences that are interpersonally noncomparable. We first show that, even if all agents share the same time preferences, there is a conflict between the axioms of Pareto principle, time...

We propose a class of decisive collective choice rules that rely on a linear ordering to partition the majority relation into two acyclic relations. The first of these relations is used to pare down the set of the feasible alternatives into a shortlist while the second is used to make a final...

We consider dynamic processes of coalition formation in which a principal bargains sequentially with a group of agents. This problem is at the core of a variety of applications in economics, including lobbying, exclusive deals, and acquisition of complementary patents. In this context, we study...

Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown that the only single-valued social choice functions (SCFs) that satisfy non-imposition (i.e., the function's range coincides with its codomain) and strategyproofness (i.e., voters are never better off by misrepresenting their preferences) are dictatorships....

Using survey experiments in the United States and Germany with 12,000 participants, we examine perceptions of life expectancy inequality between rich and poor people. The life expectancy of the poor is underestimated more than that of the rich, leading to exaggerated perceptions of inequality in...

Using survey experiments in the United States and Germany with 12,000 participants, we examine perceptions of life expectancy inequality between rich and poor people. The life expectancy of the poor is underestimated more than that of the rich, leading to exaggerated perceptions of inequality in...

Using survey experiments in the United States and Germany with 12,000 participants, we examine perceptions of life expectancy inequality between rich and poor people. The life expectancy of the poor is underestimated more than that of the rich, leading to exaggerated perceptions of inequality in...

We study a voting model with partial information in which the evaluation of social welfare must be based on information about agents' top choices plus qualitative background conditions on preferences. The former is elicited individually, while the latter is not. The social evaluator is modeled...