This paper theoretically and experimentally explores a fixed price mechanism inwhich, if aggregate demand exceeds supply, bidders are proportionally rationed. Ifdemand is uncertain, in equilibrium bidders overstate their true demand in order toalleviate the effects of being rationed. This effect...

Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Arbeiten von Jon Elster zum Problem lokaler Gerechtigkeit. Das Thema dieser Arbeiten sind Rationierungsentscheidungen. Es geht um die Allokation und Distribution knapper Zuteilungsgüter, also etwa um die Vergabe von Kindergarten- oder Studienplätzen, die Zuweisung...

This paper reconsiders experimental tests of the English clock auction. We point out why the standard procedure can only use a small subset of all bids, which gives rise to a selection bias. We propose an alternative yet equivalent format that makes all bids visible, and apply it to a 'wallet...

We develop a new dynamic equilibrium model with heterogeneous households that captures the most important frictions that arise in housing rental markets and explains the political popularity of affordable housing policies. We estimate the model using data collected by the New York Housing...

I study the welfare optimal allocation of a number of identical and indivisible objects to a set of heterogeneous risk-neutral agents under the hypothesis that money is not available. Agents have independent private values, which represent the maximum time that they are willing to wait in line...