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This paper proposes a general incomplete information framework for studying behavior in strategic games with stepwise (viz. `level-k' or `cognitive hierarchy') thinking, which has been found to describe strategic behavior well in experiments involving players' initial responses to games. It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671248
We generalize the "No-speculative-trade" theorem for finite unawareness belief structures in Heifetz, Meier, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010507616
higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to …Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a), we develop Bayesian games … with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010507620
We prove a no-speculative-trade theorem under unawareness for the infinite case. This generalizes the result for the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318836
higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to …Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2012), we develop Bayesian games … with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282088
I develop awareness-dependent subjective expected utility by taking unawareness structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier … awareness-dependent subject expected utility and assigns probability zero to some subsets of states that are not necessarily … events. I discuss in what sense impersonal expected utility can not represent unawareness. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282094
We generalize the No-trade theorem for finite unawareness belief structures in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282118
higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to …Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a), we develop Bayesian games … with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240317
higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to …Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2012), we develop Bayesian games … with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010549855
higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to …Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a), we develop Bayesian games … with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010826367