Fixed-price selling is common in today's markets. While previous research in marketing and economics literatures provide several intuitive reasons for the emergence of fixed-price selling (e.g. clarity and simplicity of managing the fixed-price process, reduced coordination and information...

We study the selection and dynamics of two popular pricing policies fixed price and flexible pricing in competitive markets. Our paper extends previous work in marketing, e.g. Desai and Purohit (2004) by focusing on decentralized markets with a dynamic and fully competitive framework while also...

We present a search-and-matching model of the housing market where potential buyers' willingness to pay is private information and sellers may become desperate as they are unable to sell. A unique steady state equilibrium exists where desperate sellers offer sizeable price cuts and sell faster....

The housing market exhibits a puzzling yet repetitive seasonal boom and bust cycle where prices and trade volume rise in summers and fall in winters. This paper presents a search model that analytically generates the observed deterministic cycle.

We present a stylized model of the over-the-counter (OTC) markets in the tradition of Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen 2005 with three distinctive features: (i) Buyers' willingness to pay is private information. (ii) Dividends depend on the state of the macro economy. (iii) Sellers become...

The US housing market exhibits seasonal boom and bust cycles where prices and the speed of trade (turnover rate) rise in summers and fall in winters. We present a search model that analytically generates the observed cycles. The proposed mechanism is based on swings in market thickness rather...

We endogenize the trading mechanism selection in a model of directed search with risk averse buyers and show that the unique symmetric equilibrium entails all sellers using fixed price trading. Mechanisms that prescribe the sale price as a function of the realized demand (auctions, bargaining,...

We present an equilibrium search model of competing mechanisms where some buyers are budget constrained. Absent budget constraints, the existing literature capitulates that if buyers differ in their valuations then in the unique equilibrium all sellers hold second price auctions (e.g. McAfee...

We endogenize the trading mechanism selection in a model of directed search with risk averse buyers and show that the unique symmetric equilibrium entails all sellers using fixed price trading. Mechanisms that prescribe the sale price as a function of the realized demand (auctions, bargaining,...

We develop an equilibrium search model of the housing market where sellers may become distressed as they are unable to sell. A unique steady state equilibrium exists where distressed sellers attempt fire sales by accepting prices that are substantially below fundamental values. During periods...