This paper was begun during a visit at the Cowles Foundation in Fall 2000 and revised during a visit in Fall 2002: Michael Magill and Martine Quinzii are grateful for the stimulating environment and the research support provided by the Cowles Foundation. We are also grateful to Bob Shiller for...

Actions a firm takes in one market may affect its profitability in other markets, beyond any joint economies or diseconomies in production. The reason is that an action in one market, by changing marginal costs in a second market, may change competitors' strategies in that second market. We show...

We extend Arrow's analysis of portfolio choice in a one-period model to savings and portfolio choice in a two-period model.

The purpose of this paper, which takes up after D. Cass (1984a, 1984b) is to find the degree of real indeterminacy inherent in models with purely financial assets. We solve the problem for the case where there are enough traders (precisely, the number of traders is larger than the number of...

We derive the existence of a Walras equilibrium directly from Nash's theorem on noncooperative games. No price player is involved, nor are generalized games. Instead we use a variant of the Shapley-Shubik trading-post game.

Let assets be denominated in an a priori specified numeraire. Whether or not the asset is complete, a competitive equilibrium exists as long as arbitrage is possible when assets are free. Generically, the set of competitive equilibria is finite, and the equilibrium prices and allocations in the...

Under the assumption of common priors, if the information partitions of two agents are finite, then simply by communicating back and forth and revising their posteriors the two agents will converge to a common equilibrium posterior, even though they may base their posteriors on quite different...

We construct stationary Markov equilibria for an economy with fiat money, one non-durable commodity, countably-many time periods, and a continuum of agents. The total production of commodity remains constant, but individual agents' endowments fluctuate in a random fashion, from period to period....

If two people have different probability assessments about the realization of an uncertain event, they can design a contingent agreement such as a bet or gamble that offers each of them positive expected value. Yet, in the process of formulating this kind of agreement, information about the...

We build a one-period general equilibrium model with money. Equilibrium exists, and fiat money has positive value, as long as the ratio of outside money to inside money is less than the gains to trade available at autarky. We show that the nominal effects of government fiscal and monetary policy...