Interest groups pay monetary contributions to gain access and provide information to a policymaker. If their interests are aligned with those of the policymaker's constituency, they have costless access and report their private information truthfully. If their interests conflict, they are forced...

In political settings, delegation is often motivated by differences in expertise of costs of information gathering. Even if a political principal is less well informed than a regulatory agency, she can monitor whether the agency is acting in her best interests by taking informational cues from...

The Nordhaus hypothesis about the political business cycle asserts that elected politicians have incentives to expand the money supply prior to elections to stimulate the economy and thereby engineer their reelection. Central bank independence is widely regarded as an institutional solution to...

An incumbent policymaker has incentives to expand the money supply prior to elections to stimulate the economy and thereby further her chances of re-election. In its original formulation, the Nordhaus political business cycle hypothesis relies on adaptive inflation expectations and naive...