This paper considers the impact of privatization on corporate entrepreneurship. The proposed model illustrates how a firm's capacity to implement internal changes is influenced by three factors: credibility of the privatization process, speed of the process, and the new regulatory environment....

This paper discusses the reasons that drive organizations to interrupt outsourcing, reverse their previous decision, and then reintegrate activities formerly delegated to providers. Contractual approaches, mainly derived from Transaction Costs Economics, offer some plausible explanations for...

The political theory of regulation holds that deregulation of utilities obliges the former monopoly to abandon its rent-seeking activities to concentrate upon economic activities. However, the arguments presented by scholars to explain this strategic transformation are not entirely convincing....

Previous studies have shown that regulated firms diversify for reasons that are different than for unregulated firms. We explore some of these differences by providing a theoretical model that starts by considering the firm-regulator relationship as an incomplete information issue, in which a...

Focusing on the collaboration intersecting public, non-profit and private spheres of economic activity, we analyse the conceptual forms of hybridity embedded in these novel inter-organizational arrangements, and link them to different mechanisms of creating social value. We first disentangle...

This study investigates contracting mechanisms in situations of opportunistic disputes between organizations. We specifically explore the relationships between the formal versus informal nature of opportunism and the formal versus informal nature of contractual governance. We use a unique data...