This paper investigates the case of market entry strategies following the introduction of a disruptive innovation. Recognizing that market entry strategies have been envisioned in the literature as a discrete phenomenon, we develop an empirical framework that portrays these strategies as a...

In this paper, three experiments investigate the role of expertise as a moderator of the relationship between implicit and explicit measures of attitudes

This communication is in concern with knowledge-management as a theorico-practical field. It focuses on both epistemological and ethical implications of knowledge conceptions on people engaged in such knowledge-management projects and on society.

At a very early age, the child becomes a real consumer and the prices becomes part of his daily basis. This exploratory study shows that the child acquires a knowledge of prices through a non linear and non cumulative training, marked out by formative incidents. He uses measures and strategies...

In this paper, the authors develop a three-dimensional conceptual framework for value generation in buyouts that categorizes and links the different levers of buyouts value generation. This framework provides the basis to take a look beyond individual value levers and shed light on the...

The working paper discusses the profitability of service offers in industrial firms. It first lists the main arguments supporting the theoretical debate, and then describes the results of a field study implemented in six industrial SME’s, which highlights the heterogeneity of their practices...

In this paper we show that long run market informational inefficiency is perfectly compatible with standard rational sequential trade models. Our inefficiency result is obtained taking into account two features of actual financial markets: tradable quantities belong to a quantity grid and...

In this note we study a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining procedure between two risk neutral individuals engaged in the joint stochastic production of a commodity. Each individual has to exert effort, that is, to provide a one-dimensional input which is unobserved to the other individual. The...

We study stochastic games with incomplete information on one side, where the transition is controlled by one of the players. <p> We prove that if the informed player also controls the transition, the game has a value, whereas if the uninformed player controls the transition, the max-min value, as...</p>

We develop a model of price formation in a dealership market where monitoring of the information flow requires costly effort. The result is imperfect monitoring, which creates profit opportunities for speculators who pick off "stale quotes". Externalities associated with monitoring give rise to...