This article introduces a model of rationality that combines procedural utility over actions with consequential utility over payoffs. It applies the model to the Prisoners' Dilemma and shows that empirically observed cooperative behaviors can be rationally explained by a procedural utility for...

A computational procedure, Simulated Fictitious Play (SFP), is introduced to approximate equilibrium solutions for n-person, non-cooperative games with large strategy spaces. A variant of the iterative solution process fictitious play (FP), SFP is first demonstrated on several small n-person...

This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the "coalition unanimity" game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2003). Our conditions are defined on the strategic form game used...

No abstract received.

In this paper, we consider a pure exchange economy with a finite number of agents who behave strategically on endowments. A notion of strategic equilibrium with partial disposability is defined and it is shown the existence of mixed strategies equilibria. Purification results on the strategic...

A concept of altruistic behavior (called friendly behavior) has been defined and used for equilibrium selection in some bargaining models in Rusinowska (2002), "Refinements of Nash Equilibria in view of Jealous and Friendly Behavior of Players", International Game Theory Review, 4, 281–299.In...

In this paper we characterize a general existence theorem concerning E-points for n-persons extensive games with complete information. We provide a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of such E-points.

This paper is concerned with the question of how to define the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a finite sequence of exogenously specified TU-games. Three different core concepts are presented: the...

It is argued that when morphisms are ignored virtually all coalitional, strategic and extensive game formats as currently employed in the extant game-theoretic literature may be presented in a fairly natural way as (concrete categories over) discrete subcategories of Chu(Set,2). Moreover, under...

No abstract received.