We show that the Owen value for TU games with a cooperation structure extends the Shapley value in a consistent way. In particular, the Shapley value is the expected Owen value for all symmetric distributions on the partitions of the player set. Similar extensions of the Banzhaf value do not...

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The paper deals with standard mathematical models for nonlinear affine control systems with two (vector-valued) inputs u (=control) and w (unknown except for a bound for the sup-norm). Interpretation of this scenario and its wide range of applications (in control and differential game theory):...

Consider the cooperative coalition games with side payments. Bargaining sets are calculated for all possible coalition structures to obtain a collection of imputations rather than single imputation. Our aim is to obtain a single payoff vector, which is acceptable by all players of the game under...

In many share problems there is an a priori given a natural set of possible divisions to solve the sharing problem. Cooperative games related to such share sets are introduced, which may be helpful in solving share problems. Relations between properties of share sets and properties of games are...

Under dynamic cooperation a player may use 'irrational' acts to extort additional gains if later circumstances allow. In this article we present a condition under which even if irrational behaviors appear later in the game the concerned player would still be performing better under the...

The literature on normal form games generally depicts the payoff matrices of two or three players. However, many such games discuss n-players. Therefore, this note studies the payoff representations of n-player normal form games.

In this paper we introduce two simple versions of the hat game for three players and a generalization for n players. We compute the extensive version of the game and all the equilibrium and friendly equilibrium points as a simple example of the structure function.

We study strategic games where players' preferences are weak orders which need not admit utility representations. First of all, we extend Voorneveld's concept of best-response potential from cardinal to ordinal games and derive the analogue of his characterization result: An ordinal game is a...