In this note, we state a zero-maximum principle for core allocations, a result which was foreseen by Luenberger (1995). We prove a generalization of the first-zero maximum theorem of Luenberger. Roughly said, an allocation is in the core if for every coalition, the sum of individual benefit...

Stable networks of order r where r is a natural number refer to those networks that are immune to coalitional deviation of size r or less. In this paper, we introduce stability of a finite order and examine its relation with efficient networks under anonymous and component additive value...

This paper introduces the class of 2 × 2 × 2 trimatrix games with identical anonymous best-replies. For this class a complete classification on the basis of the Nash equilibrium set is provided.

This paper introduces an extension of the vehicle routing problem by including several distributors in competition. Each customer is characterized by demand and a wholesale price. Under this scenario a solution may have unserviced customers and elementary routes with no customer visits. The...

In this paper, we reconsider the concept of Berge equilibrium. In a recent work, Colman et al. [(2011) J. Math. Psych. 55, 166–175] proposed a correspondence for two-player games between Berge and Nash equilibria by permutation of the utility functions. We define here more general...

In this paper, we investigate the existence of Berge–Zhukovskii equilibrium in general normal form games. We characterize its existence via the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium of some n-person subgame derived of the initial game. The significance of the obtained results is...

In repeated games, equilibria requiring threats of punishment may be implausible if punishing a deviator hurts all the others. When all the punishers suffer from carrying out a punishment in the continuation, it would be in their best interest to forgive the deviation. Taking this line of...

This paper presents a solution formula for the payoff distribution procedure of a bargaining problem in cooperative differential game that would lead to a time consistent outcome. In particular, individual rationality is satisfied for every player throughout the cooperation period.

If an aggregative game satisfies the generalized Hahn conditions, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium which may not be interior and is globally asymptotically stable under two alternative continuous adjustment processes with non-negativity constraints.

In this paper, we present a simple axiomatization of the n-person egalitarian solution. The single condition sufficient for characterization is a new axiom, called symmetric decomposability that combines the axioms of step-by-step negotiations, symmetry, and weak Pareto optimality used in an...