This paper considers the credibility of social insurance arrangements in a dynamic moral hazard economy. A utilitarian planner selects an allocation for agents who experience privately observed taste shocks. When the planner can commit the optimal allocation exhibits an immiseration property:...

This paper considers optimal social insurance in a dynamic moral hazard economy. The existing literature has focussed on environments in which a planner and a population of agents share the same discount factor. A key finding is that agents are then almost surely immiserated; their welfare is...

Using the government's intertemporal budget constraint, we quantify the contribution of returns paid on the U.S. government's debt portfolio to the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio. We show that announcements of unconventional monetary policy measures by the Federal Reserve between 2008.IV and...

Recursive Game Theory provides theoretical procedured for computing the equilibrium payoff sets of repeated games and the equilibrium payoff correspondences of dynamic games. These procedures can not be directly implemented on a computer since they involve the computations of objects with...

There are two important rules in a patent race: what an innovator must accomplish to receive the patent and the allocation of the benefits that flow from the innovation. Most patent races end before R&D is completed and the prize to the innovator is often less than the social benefit of the...

This paper investigates the likelihood of factor-price equalization under the simple assumptions of Heckscher-Ohlin Theory. Factor-price equalization is also directly related to whether countries specialize or not in the global market. A full-equilibrium in the world requires not only the...

I explore the nature of optimal static and dynamic contracts in an environment with moral hazard, where individuals contracting with the same principal receive correlated productivity shocks. The environment resembles the one considered in relative compensation theory ( i.e tournament theory),...