We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies over time according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a dynamic game, we allow the possibility for coalitions to deviate at any time and thereby to give rise to a new environment. A coalition that...

Any group of risk neutral agents who hold differing beliefs is vulnerable to money pumps (arbitrage). Thus, the agents may wish to reconcile their beliefs into a new joint belief. We propose a criterion for the choice of reconciled belief based on the notion of ``rate of arbitrage.''' It is...

We study a two-person zero-sum game where players simultaneously choose sequences of actions, and the overall payoff is the average of a one-shot payoff over the joint sequence. We consider the maxmin value of the game played in pure strategies by boundedly rational players and model bounded...

This paper studies a repeated minority game with public signals, symmetric bounded recall, and pure strategies. We investigate both public and private equilibria of the game with fixed recall size. We first show how public equilibria in such a repeated game can be represented as colored...

Several well-known stochastic orderings are defined in terms of iterated integrals of distribution or survival functions. In this note we will provide necessary conditions for some variability orderings of the above type. These conditions will be based on the comparison of mean differences,...

Von Plato (1991) has recently proposed a necessary condition for the infinite extendibility of a partially exchangeable {0, 1}-valued random vector. This paper will prove necessary conditions for the finite extendibility (of any order) of a partially exchangeable process of real-valued (not...