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containing the (Shapley) share-core, the Banzhaf share-core and the Large Banzhaf share-core. We provide characterizations of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090996
We study the behaviour of the extreme points of the core of a game in front of the reduction of the game and prove that … the extreme core points have the reduced game property but not the converse reduced game property. Nevertheless we give … some sufficient conditions on an extreme point of the core of a reduced game to extend to an extreme core point of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005022366
coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325691
coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383187
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325689
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325798
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376532
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377258
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378792
generated by a partial order on the set of players. In such a situation, the core may be unbounded, and one has to select a … bounded part of the core as a solution concept. The restricted core is obtained by imposing equality constraints in the core … for sets belonging to so-called normal collections, resulting (if nonempty) in the selection of a bounded face of the core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010585720