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Two methods for calibrating discrete choice contingent valuation responses – the dichotomous choice with followup certainty question method of Champ et al. (1997) and the multiple bounded method of Welsh and Poe (1998) – are evaluated using data from a field validity comparison of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010921184
This paper presents an experimental investigation of the three ambient-based mechanisms proposed by Segerson [J. Environ. Econom. Management 15, 87-98 (1988)] for controlling emissions from a group of nonpoint source polluters: a marginal tax/subsidy, a fixed penalty, and a mechanism that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010921279
Recent papers show that in group decisions individuals have social preferences for efficiency and equity. However, the effect of social preferences on voting, the predominant funding mechanism for public goods, has not been thoroughly examined. This study investigates whether voting decisions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010921329
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Tax authorities utilize the audit process, imposing penalties on tax evaders, as their primary means of enforcement. In recent years, a “service” paradigm, whereby tax authorities provide information about correct tax reporting to taxpayers, has shown the potential to further “encourage”...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258828
In this paper we summarize the theoretical arguments of Carson and Groves, et al., and assemble early empirical evidence that comports with this theoretical framework. In doing so, we argue that redefining criterion validity in terms of consequentiality offers the potential for a fundamental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259693
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This article presents experimental tests of a linear and a nonlinear ambient tax mechanism that involve modest information requirements for the regulator. When agents are not allowed to communicate, both tax mechanisms result in emission levels that approximate the social optimum. When agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005295240