Tax fraud is a serious problem for fiscal authorities worldwide, not only in countries regarded as hightax like Germany. Besides longterm tax reforms, tax amnesties are used to bring back taxable amounts into the legal sector. The German tax amnesty of 2004/2005 was one of the last examples in...

In recent years tax authorities worldwide have implemented voluntary disclosure schemes to recover tax on offshore investments. Such Schemes are characterized by the acquisition of non-audit information on offshore holdings, and a subsequent opportunity for affected taxpayers to make a voluntary...

The Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA) implemented the Voluntary Compliance Window (VCW) in 2013/2014 fiscal year as a means of bringing non-compliant taxpayers into the tax net. The programme was a huge success in terms of revenue and the cost of collection at 0.8% was by far below the 3% benchmark...

This paper develops a simple model to explore whether a higher detection probability for offshore tax evaders-e.g., because of improved exchange of information between countries and/or due to digitalization of tax administrations-renders it optimal for governments to introduce a voluntary...

Tax authorities worldwide are implementing voluntary disclosure schemes to recover tax on offshore investments. Such schemes are typically designed retrospectively following the bulk acquisition of information on offshore holdings, such as the recent “Paradise” and “Panama” papers. They...

It is often argued that even if optimal ex-post, settlement dilutes deterrence ex-ante. We analyze the interest for the tax authority of committing, ex-ante, to a settlement strategy. We show that to commit to the use of settlements is ex-ante optimal when the tax authority receives signals that...

It is often argued that even if optimal ex-post, settlement dilutes deterrence ex-ante. We analyze the interest for the tax authority of committing, ex-ante, to a settlement strategy. We show that to commit to the use of settlements is ex-ante optimal when the tax authority receives signals that...

We characterize equilibria of an income reporting game with bounded returns and no commitment where detected tax evaders are charged the maximally feasible amount. Introducing partial commitment to punishment relief eliminates multiplicity of equilibria. We identify a unique limit equilibrium...

The size of tax evasion and fraud appears to be increasing steadily in the EU. To a certain extent, the completion of Single Market has further encouraged firms and households evasive behaviour in paying value added taxes in the EU Member States, whereas such efforts have traditionally been most...

Many countries apply lower fines to tax evading individuals when they voluntarily disclose the tax evasion they committed. I model such voluntary disclosure mechanisms theoretically and show that while such mechanisms increase the incentive to evade taxes, they nevertheless increase tax revenues...