Financial constraints affecting new firms are some of the factors most cited for impeding entrepreneurial dynamics from flourishing. This article introduces the problem of regional patterns of financial constraints. The research is conducted with regard to the French regions and the new French...

Financial constraints affecting new firms are some of the factors most cited for impeding entrepreneurial dynamics from flourishing. This article introduces the problem of regional patterns of financial constraints. The research is conducted with regard to the French regions and the new French...

We consider a moral hazard setup wherein leveraged firms have incentives to take on excessive risks and are thus rationed when they attempt to borrow in order to meet liquidity shocks. The rationed firms can optimally pledge cash as collateral to borrow more, but in the process must liquidate...

In this paper we show that the equilibrium in the Stiglitz-Weiss model (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) is a two-interest rate equilibrium. For this we use the true return-function for banks shown by Arnold (2005), the assumption of Bertrand competition and make a consideration for a discrete number...

Banks often have to determine the credit worthiness, i.e. the ability to repay the loan, of their customers ex-ante. According to the theory of imperfect diagnosis, it can be rational not to use an informative diagnosis result, even though it can be acquired without costs. We call this...

The financing of agricultural producers is one of the most acute problems along the entire scope of economic reforms in Kazakhstan. The issue is: What kind of financial sources could maintain the development of agricultural production? Internal sources such as profit, depreciation capital, and...

We provide new micro evidence on the discussion about the relationship between financial development and welfare. Relying on the concept of local financial development our analysis focuses on three dimensions of household welfare: vulnerability to poverty, investment, and consumption smoothing....

Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore...

In this paper, we conduct an empirical analysis of the impact of better judicial enforcement on the probability of being credit rationed, loan size, and the probability of bankruptcy using household-level data from the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers, conducted by the Institute for Research...