reputation in long-term relationships. …

-selection approach to reputations in the context of a long-lived player, who may be a “normal” type or one of a number of “commitment … the equilibrium payoff of the long-lived player (demonstrating ex ante reputation effects) and to show that this lower … bound is asymptotically irrelevant under imperfect monitoring (demonstrating the impermanence of reputation effects). The …

candidate's reputation. …

increasing function of the value of a candidate’s reputation. …

For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and … Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation …’s reputation is private. …

's reputation. We also show how the model can be extended so that rhetoric also signals candidate quality. …

For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and … Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation …’s reputation is private. We also show that the rate at which reputations disappear is uniform across equilibria and that …

This paper examines whether reputation concerns can induce the central bank to implement the time-inconsistent optimal … to the possible inflation bias; second, it enables us to model more satisfactorily the reputation of the central bank by …