We analyze optimal labor contracts when the worker is inequity averse towards the employer. Welfare is maximized for an equal sharing rule of surplus between the worker and the firm. That is, profit sharing is optimal even if effort is contractible. If the firm can make a take-it-or leave-it...

In this paper are presented essential themes in the subject of personnel economics. In the first part analysis has been conducted on the impact of peer pressure on workplace behaviour. Then again models for compensation structures within firms, and their influence on the utility of work by...

This paper determines which individual variables actually driveexercise patterns and how employees value their stock options.

This paper tries to answer the following questions: How do employees exercise their stock options? How do employees dispose of company stock acquired in stock option programs? What rational and behavioral factors explain differences in observed exercise behavior?

By incorporating reciprocity in an otherwise standard principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some, but not all, workers care more for their principal when they are convinced that...

Using novel compensation data on white collar employees (WCE) in large, public U.S. firms, we examine their explicit financial incentives and implicit incentives arising from promotions and labor market opportunities. We find that employees with stronger (weaker) implicit incentives receive more...

Despite three decades of scholarship on economic restructuring in the US, employers' violations of minimum wage, overtime, and other workplace laws remain understudied. This article begins to fill the gap by presenting evidence from a large-scale, original worker survey that draws on recent...

Adverse selection harms workers, but benefits firms able to identify talent. An informed intermediary expropriates its agents' ability by threatening to fire and expose them to undervaluation of their skill. Agents' track record gradually reduces the intermediary's information advantage. We show...

Using data from the online platform Glassdoor, we provide evidence that performance pay tracks an employee's role within the firm, exacerbates income inequality, and varies more than base pay across time, especially for job transitions. Employees in occupations requiring more interpersonal...

This paper presents the results from a field experiment that examines the effects of non-financial performance feedback on the behavior of professionals working for an insurance repair company. We vary the frequency (weekly and monthly) and the level of detail of the feedback that the 800...