The usage of performance-vesting (p-v) equity awards to top executives in large U.S. companies has grown from 20 to 70 percent from 1998 to 2012. We measure the effects of p-v provisions on value, delta, and vega of equity-based compensation. We find large differences in the value of p-v awards...

We develop the first structural model of a multitasking salesforce to address questions of job design and incentive compensation design. The model incorporates three novel features: (i) multitasking effort choice given a multidimensional incentive plan; (ii) salesperson's private information...

This paper examines how corporate governance reporting corresponds to actual conduct regarding severance payment caps for prematurely departing members of companies' executive boards in Germany. For this purpose, we first evaluate the declarations of conformity for all companies listed in the...

This paper examines whether the risk-taking incentives induced by performance-based vesting (p-v) compensation influence bank loan contracting and credit ratings. Consistent with our risk-shifting hypothesis, we find that the p-v based compensation, as measured by the proportion of grant date...

This paper develops a novel field experiment to test the implicit prediction of tournament theory that competition increases work time and can therefore contribute to the long work hours required in elite occupations. A majority of workers in the treatment without explicit financial incentives...

Explicit relative performance awards (RPE) have become an important component of executive compensation. We calculate the value and incentives of explicit RPE awards and find that RPE awards that use a custom peer group are structured both in terms of the peer group and payout design to filter...

In recent years, scholars and policymakers have devoted considerable attention to the potential consequences of employment noncompetition agreements and to whether legislatures ought to reform the laws that govern the enforcement of these controversial contractual provisions. Unfortunately, much...

This paper develops a novel field experiment to test the implicit prediction of tournament theory that competition increases work time and can therefore contribute to the long work hours required in elite occupations. A majority of workers in the treatment without explicit financial incentives...

We study derivative instruments that corporate insiders use to diversify and hedge their equity ownership. Our evidence suggests that boards might allow use of these instruments in order to mitigate agency costs associated with overvalued equity and high equity-based pay. These instruments are...

Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Entwicklung der Akzeptanz der Empfehlung G.13 Satz 1 des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex (in der Fassung vom 16. Dezember 2019, vormals 4.2.3 Abs. 4 Satz 1), die für vorzeitige Vertragsbeendigungen von Vorstandsmitgliedern Abfindungsobergrenzen vorsieht. Die...