Similar Search Results

Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina; Rau, Holger A. - 2022

Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of … the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938866

Estimating consumer damages in cartel cases

Laitenberger, Ulrich; Smuda, Florian - 2013

We use consumer panel data to calculate the damage suffered by German consumers due to a detergent cartel that was active between 2002 and 2005 in eight European countries. Applying before-and-after and difference-in-differences estimations we find average overcharges between 6.7 and 6.9 percent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010128730

Let's lock them in : collusion under consumer switching costs

Fourberg, Niklas - 2018

Consumer switching costs cause the market demand of consumers who already bought a supplier's product to be less elastic while they simultaneously increase competition for new consumers. I study the effect of this twofold pricing incentive on firms' price setting behavior in a 2x2 factorial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011892961

Estimating consumer damages in cartel cases

Laitenberger, Ulrich; Smuda, Florian - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957676

Cartel overcharges and the deterrent effect of EU competition law

Smuda, Florian - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) - 2012

This paper examines cartel overcharges for the European market. Using a sample of 191 overcharge estimates and several parametric and semi-parametric estimation procedures, the impact of different cartel characteristics and the market environment on the magnitude of overcharges is analyzed. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957719

Short-term managerial contracts and cartels

Han, Martijn A. - 2012

the results in light of firm financing suggests that debt-financed firms can form more-stable cartels than equity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318793

On the sustainability of collusion in Bertrand supergames with discrete pricing and nonlinear demand

Zimmerman, Paul R. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

In traditional industrial organization models of Bertrand supergames, the critical discount factor governing the sustainability of collusion is independent of key demand and supply parameters. Recent research has demonstrated that these counterintuitive results stem from the assumption that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545986

The Bankruptcy Wildcard in Cartel Cases

Stephan, Andreas - Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia - 2006

Where fines are the only available sanction against cartels there is a trade-off between increased deterrence and the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970310

Survey of Public Attitudes to Price-Fixing and Cartel Enforcement in Britain

Stephan, Andreas - Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia - 2007

cartels. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005001432

Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory and Evidence from the European Union

Allain, Marie-Laure; Boyer, Marcel; Kotchoni, Rachidi; … - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2013

Deterring the formation or continuation of cartels is a major objective of antitrust policy. We develop a dynamic …. Dissuader la formation ou le maintien des cartels est un objectif important de la politique antitrust. Nous développons un cadre … détection et de conviction. Nous montrons que la prise en compte appropriée de la dynamique des cartels joue un rôle clé dans la …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011183779