Modern 'principal-agent theory' has made a lot of progress in proposing theoretical Solutions to agency problems. This paper contributes to a better understanding of behavior in agency situations. In particular, we provide experimental evidence on offered contracts and effort choices in a simple...

In recent years, the performance-based approach to contracting for medical services has been gaining popularity across different healthcare delivery systems, both in the United States (under the name of "pay for performance") and abroad ("payment by results" in the United Kingdom). The goal of...

This paper investigates the interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives. We propose a simple principal-agent model with control that incorporates the existence of social groups resulting from common experiences in the past. Our laboratory experiment shows that agents with previous common...

Bezugsgenossenschaften weisen durch das Verhältnis zu ihren Eigentümern, welche gleichzeitig Kunden des Unternehmens sind, erhebliche Unterschiede zu anderen Unternehmenstypen auf. Eine Entlohnung der genossenschaftlichen Unternehmensleitung sollte diese Besonderheit berücksichtigen. Dieser...

This work contributes to empirical studies on decentralization and corruption by trying to resolve the uncertainty that the literature so far has shown. It also gives reasons supporting the ‘best’ decentralization structure which a country can adopt to discourage corrupt behaviour, and...

This paper explores the role of social groups in explaining the reaction to control.We propose a simple model with a principal using control devices and a controlledagent, which incorporates the existence of social groups. Testing experimentally theconjectures derived from the model and related...

A significant and growing share of US agricultural output is produced under a production or marketing contract. An important controversy regarding agricultural production contracts is the control of non-labor inputs. Over time, contracts have tended to place more inputs under the buyer's control...

Public-private partnerships have become an important tool for delivering essential public goods, but critics fear that they erode public accountability. Making partnerships more accountable requires a clear understanding of what accountability means for partnerships and which mechanisms can be...

I show that deterministic dynamic contracts between a principal and an agent are always at least as profitable to the principal as stochastic ones, if the so-called first-order approach in dynamic mechanism design is satisfied. The principal commits, while the agent\'s type evolution follows a...