Do political institutions shape the structure of public spending? Based on a sample of 141 elections in eighteen Western European countries over the period 1970-1998, this paper shows that governments’ margin of maneuverability to design and implement fiscal policies depends on the level of...

What drives extreme and rare economic events? Motivated by recent theory, and events in US subprime markets, we begin to open the black box of extremes. Specifically, we build a taxonomy of extremes, then extend standard economic analysis of extreme risk. First, we model the potentially relevant...

The present paper analyses the role played by risk aversion in the reconciling of agricultural income and biodiversity. A bio-economic mode which articulates bird community dynamics and representative farmers selecting land uses within an uncertain macro-economic context is developed. It is...

Наибольший объем задач по осуществлению инфраструктурной поддержки предпринимательской деятельности приходится на государственный сектор, который...

We propose a simple behavioral model to analyze situations where (1) a group of agents repeatedly plays a public goods game within a network structure and (2) each agent only observes the past behavior of her neighbors, but is affected by the decisions of the whole group. The model assumes that...

This paper is a query about the determinants of individuals contribution to the production of local public goods subject to important indivisibilities. It is based on an econometric study of factors accounting for variations in individual participation in the construction of a central drainage...

This study analyzes the efficiency of equilibria in a multilateral bargaining game in which a legislature divides its budget among collective and particularistic goods. In order to disentangle the causes of inefficiency, we extend the model of Volden and Wiseman (Am Polit Sci Rev 101:79–92, <CitationRef...</citationref>

Price regulation for Italian water's services is historically swinging between macroeconomic aims and sectoral or microeconomics different objectives. The effects on operating firms are obviously the worst: difficulties to plan long term investments, difficulties to organise activities,...

In a laboratory experiment groups of four played a 15-period Public Good game. Each period a player could either invest in a green sector or in a more profitable but polluting brown sector. The pollutant accumulated and decreased the players’ income in all following periods. We conducted...