We investigate a three-person coalition game in which one bargainer, the builder, can propose and build a coalition over two stages. In equilibrium, coalition building ends with an efficient grand coalition, while the equilibrium path is contingent on the values of the two-person coalitions and...

We present the model of games with incomplete information first introduced by Harsanyi and show the link with extensive form games with imperfect information. We provide then a construction of the universal type space of Mertens and Zamir together with some properties.

90 Classical problems in economics are concerned with the solutions of several simultaneous nonlinear optimization problems, one for each consumer or producer, all facing constraints posed by the scarcity of resources. Often their interests conflict, and it is generally impossible to find a...

Since some Nash equilibria can be considered as irrational, we are interested here in refinements of Nash equilibria, i.e. concepts of solutions associating to each game a subset of Nash equilibria of this game. Considering only finite games with normal form, we first define the most desirable...

Is selfishness always a bad thing, in the sense that people can only be better off when everyone is concerned with well-being of others as well as with his own, or are there situations in which altruis, can actually make things worse for all people involved? This paper tackles this question in...

This paper discusses and develops "non-welfaristic" arguments on distributive justice, mainly basing upon J. Rawls and A.K. Sen, and formalizes, in cooperative production economies, "non-welfaristic" distribution rules as game forms. First, it conceptualizes Needs Principle that the distribution...

This paper examines equilibrioum and stability in symmetric two-player cheap-talk games. In particular, we characterize the set of neutrally stable outcomes in finite cheap-talk 2x2 coordination games.

We study the tendering decisions of shareholders endowed with multiple shares to test game-theoretic models of the tendering process in the laboratory. An equilibrium outcome in which value-increasing takeovers always just succeed fails to emerge. Rather, tendered shares cycle around the...

This paper shows a new way to approach the analysis of international environmental problems and provides a heuristic 'comparative instrument analysis' using this approach. The conclusion is that economic instruments provide certain desirable properties, especially the achievement of cost...

We explore sequential voting in symmetric two-option environments. We show that the (informative) symmetric equilibria of the simultaneous voting game are also equilibria in any sequential voting structure. In unanimity games, (essentially) the whole set of equilibria is the same in all...