Traditional interpretations of politics among nuclear-weapons states–as epitomized by Schellingʹs theory of deterrence through mutually-assured destruction–are less useful in todayʹs proliferation environment than they were during the Cold Warʹs superpower rivalry. As...

We model corruption in a society as a result of bargaining for bribes between private citizens and public officials. We investigate the role that incomplete information with respect to the intrinsic moral cost of one's potential corruption partner plays out in his or her propensity to engage in...

The discussion on the use of Genetically Modified (GM) crops has become a tedious issue. It seems that an amicable settlement of the conflicts between those who object the use of GM crops and want a general ban (more or less) on modification of plant and animal genetic resources on the one side,...

The authors’ theory contributes an alternative domestic politics pathway to traditional bargaining models of war termination. In bargaining models, the rational updating process that produces an overlapping bargaining space can develop a significant lag, which extends the war beyond a...

In most economic models of damage compensation, the indemnity is proportional to the fault and victims have to file the claim. Contrary to the tort law approach, a growing number of reparation mechanisms choose to ignore the fault (“no-fault law”) to compensate damages in their entirety. The...

In a general model of trading networks with bilateral contracts, we propose a suitably adapted chain stability concept that plays the same role as pairwise stability in two-sided settings. We show that chain stability is equivalent to stability if all agents' preferences are jointly fully...