Institutional investors manage an increasingly substantial share of securities in the developed markets. Previous research has concluded that mutual funds’ clients do have asymmetric reactions, for they increase capital flows to mutual funds that are winners in performance, but fail to move...

The potential manager-investor conflict of interests in mutual funds is a classic agency problem. Using a database from Portugal, we show that mutual funds tend to overweight the stocks issued by their parent and underweigh the stocks of competitors. This cannot be explained by performance,...

Several supervisory authorities and governmental working groups issued corporate governance best practice codes for listed companies during the nineties. In this paper, we used a unique database that allowed us to analyse the relationship between the level of compliance of the code of best...

The absence of investor reaction to the poor performance of mutual funds is a widely reported phenomenon. This article investigates the role of load costs as an explanation for the phenomenon and concludes that back-end load fees are an obstacle to reaction. We found evidence consistent with the...