Research in experimental economics has cogently challenged the fundamental precept of neoclassical economics that economic agents optimize. The last two decades have seen elaboration of boundedly rational models that try to move away from the optimization approach, in ways consistent with...

We study experimentally voluntary contributions to public goods when none, some, or all previous decisions are observable. When agents observe previous moves, they tend to condition their cooperation on observed cooperation. This leads to two effects of increased transparency: on the one hand,...

This paper models the organization of the firm as a type of artificial neural network in a duopoly setting. The firm plays a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma type game, and must also learn to map environmental signals to demand parameters and to its rival’s willingness to cooperate. We study the...

We model the organization of the firm as a type of artificial neural network in a duopoly framework. The firm plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma type game, but also must learn to map environmental signals to demand parameters. We study the prospects for cooperation given the need for the firm...

This paper presents a simple boundedly rational model of a firm and consumer behaviour. We formulate an entry game, where every firm decides on investing in R&D for inventing a new product that will appeal to certain group of consumers. The success depends on the amount of funds available for...

This paper considers a two-production-period model in which a state-owned firm competes against a labour-managed firm. In the first production period, the state-owned and labour-managed firms simultaneously and independently choose outputs. The chosen outputs become common knowledge and then, in...

This paper considers mixed Cournot duopoly competition with two production periods in which labour-managed and profit-maximizing firms compete against each other. The paper demonstrates that there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that coincides with the Stackelberg outcome in which the...

We examine the behaviors of one state-owned welfare-maximizing firm and one labor-managed income-per-worker-maximizing firm in a two-stage mixed market model with capacity investment as a strategic instrument. In the first stage, each firm independently decides whether or not to install...

The paper investigates pricing issues in a dyadic supply chain, in which a core supplier sells products through a fair-minded retailer. The retailer is fair-minded and has an ability of self-persuasion as well. If the retailer faces advantageous inequality, though he does not deserve these extra...

This paper investigates an emerging monetization mechanism for app developers – reward advertising. With reward ads, consumers have an option to view ads in exchange for a reward such as premium content. We investigate when and how an app developer should adopt reward ads as a mechanism for...