This paper deals with price competition among multiproduct firms. We consider a model with n firms and one representative buyer. Each firm produces a set of products that can be different or identical to the other firms' products. The buyer is characterized by her willingness to pay -in monetary...

In the present paper a model of competition between sports clubs in a sports league is presented. Clubs are endowed with initial players but at a cost clubs are able to sell their initial players and buy new players. The results are that: if the quality of players is one-dimensional, then...

There are many situations in which a customer's proclivity to buy the product of any firm depends not only on the classical attributes of the product such as its price and quality, but also on who else is buying the same product. We model these situations as games in which firms compete for...

Our main conclusion is that the demand for information services that facilitate statistical screening between profitable and unprofitable sellers is highly sensitive to the market structure. A monopsonist will use information more extensively than would two or more buyers on the same market. We...

This paper analyzes the impact of three termination rules for repeated- game experiments. We compare treatments with a known finite end, an unknown end and two variants with a random termination rule. The termination rules do not significantly eect cooperation rates.

We study the evolution of imitation behaviour in a differentiated market where firms are located equidistantly on a Salop circle. Firms choose price and quantity simultaneously, leaving open the possibility for non-market clearing outcomes. The strategy of the most successful firm is imitated....

While little attention has been paid to the role of profitability in the empirical literature on firm exit, we employ a detailed recently established database of Norwegian manufacturing firms to identify the extent to which profitability explains a firm's exit behavior. Some key characteristics...

We study communication in a static Cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private information about their costs. We show that cheap talk between the firms cannot transmit any information. However, if the firms can communicate through a third party,...

This paper studies firms' incentives to commit to transparent behavior in a competitive procedure modeled as an asymmetric information beauty contest managed by a corrupt agent. In his evaluation of firms' offers for a public contract the agent has some discretion to favor a firm in exchange for...

We study an example of strategic delegation in Cournot duopoly and show that if contracts are both observable and renegotiable before becoming common knowledge at the outset of the delegated game, the strategic value of contracts is preserved, but the set of equilibria is greatly enlarged....