We explore the efficiency and distributive implications (theoretically and experimentally) of a multilateral bargaining model with endogenous production of the surplus under two different timings: ex ante and ex post bargaining. Both timings are commonly observed in business partnerships and...

In an incomplete contract setup, past literature has separately emphasized the role of ownership and the role of access in providing incentives. Here, we de-bundle ownership into the right to access (or use) an asset and the right to veto (exclude) others from using it, and define control over...

Contract duration as component of contract design has both a transaction cost savings function by mitigating exchange hazards and a strategic value creation function by leveraging knowledge-based resources. Previous studies have not explained the value creation function of contract duration in...

A major consequence of the Internet era is the emergence of complex “platforms” that combine technology and process in new ways that often disrupt existing industry structures and blur industry boundaries. These platforms allow easy participation that often strengthens and extends network...

To clarify the determinants and interaction of property rights and transaction costs, I study the design of the legal protection of either a good whose consensual transfer entails a transaction inefficiency or an upstream firm's input whose random cost is unverifiable and ex ante...

To clarify the determinants and interaction of property rights and transaction costs, I study the design of the legal protection of either a good whose consensual transfer entails a transaction inefficiency or an upstream firm's input whose random cost is unverifiable and ex ante...

To clarify the determinants and interaction of property rights and transaction costs, I study the design of the legal protection of either a good whose consensual transfer entails a transaction inefficiency or an upstream firm's input whose random cost is unverifiable and ex ante...