We specify several variants of a structural econometric model explaining mortgage interest rates and loan sizes simultaneously. The models are estimated by simultaneous equation methods with a sample of loan files originated from a French mortgage lender. They yield estimates of the...

Before 1978, most of the U.S. domestic copper production and an important fraction of the imports were traded at a price set by the major U.S. producers. Simultaneously, the rest of the world was trading copper at prices determined in auction markets. This two-price system ended in 1978, when...

We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and the firms have private information. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction, modelled as a...

It has been shown in prior research that cost effectiveness in the competitive emissions permit market could be affected by tacit collusion or price manipulation when the corresponding polluting product market is oligopolistic. We analyze these cross market links using a Stackelberg model to...

Recent work has shown that Weitzman's policy rule for choosing price- versus quantity-based pollution control instruments under uncertainty is biased when the polluting firms possess market power (Heuson 2010). However, this study is restricted to emission standards and taxes, while tradable...

It is well known that uncertainty concerning firms’ costs as well as market power of the latter have to be taken into account in order to design and choose environmental policy instruments in an optimal way. As a matter of fact, in most actual regulation settings the policy maker has to face...

It is well known that uncertainty concerning firms' costs as well as market power of the latter have to be taken into account in order to design and choose environmental policy instruments in an optimal way. As a matter of fact, in most actual regulation settings the policy maker has to face...

Recent work has shown that Weitzman's policy rule for choosing price- versus quantity-based pollution control instruments under uncertainty is biased when the polluting firms possess market power (Heuson 2010). However, this study is restricted to emission standards and taxes, while tradable...

Attribute-based subsidies (ABS) are commonly used to promote the diffusion of energy-efficient products, whose manufacturers often wield significant market power. We develop a theoretical framework for the optimal design of ABS to account for endogenous product attributes, environmental...

We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and the firms have private information. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction, modelled as a...