We experimentally study auctions versus grandfathering in the initial assignment of pollution permits that can be traded in a secondary spot market. Low and high emitters compete for permits in the auction, while permits are assigned for free under grandfathering. In theory, trading in the spot...

This paper investigates the implications of U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol on environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, and the distribution of compliance costs for remaining Annex-B countries taking into consideration the monopoly power by the Former Soviet Union (FSU) on...

This is an invited discussion on the Manne and Richels’ paper “The Kyoto Protocol: A Cost-Effective Strategy for Meeting Environmental Objective”. It focuses on four issues or questions: distributional realities of the international climate change negotiations, correspondence between...

Emissions trading has been established as an important instrument of pollution control in many world regions. However concerns have been raised whether or not emission-trading schemes may distort competition either on the permit market itself or on related output markets. In this paper we review...

The European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) limits CO2 emissions from covered sectors, especially electricity until December 2007, after which a new set of Allowances will be issued. The paper demonstrates that the impact of controlling the quantity rather than the price of carbon is to reduce...

This paper investigates the implications of U.S. withdrawal on environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, and the distribution of compliance costs taking into account market power of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) on emission permit markets. While exercise of market power on behalf of FSU...

The paper at hand examines the power system costs when a coal tax or a fixed bonus for renewables is combined with CO2 emissions trading. It explicitly accounts for the interaction between the power and the gas market and identifies three cost effects: First, a tax and a subsidy both cause...

We extend the analysis of optimal scale in pollution permit markets by allowing for both market power and private information. We characterize the total costs (abatement costs and damages) under market power and private information and compare them to total costs under competition. It is...

This paper compares a clean energy standard (CES) and a carbon tax (CT), using theory and quantitative experiments. A two-stage duopolistic competition in the electricity sector between a polluting plant and its non-polluting rival anchors the model underlying these experiments. The CT induces...

Under perfect competition on the output market, first best technology subsidies in the presence of learning by doing are justified by knowledge spill overs that are not accounted for by individual companies. First best output subsidies are thus depending directly on the learning effects and are,...