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intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds. We identify robustness criteria which are satisfied by … Discrete Raiffa solutions. We show that the .robustness of intermediate agreements. plus additional well-known and plausible …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010593103
intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds. We identify robustness criteria which are satisfied by … Discrete Raiffa solutions. We show that the “robustness of intermediate agreements” plus additional well-known and plausible …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049666
Suppes-Sen Dominance is a commonly accepted criterion of impartiality in distributive justice. Mariotti (1999) characterized the Nash bargaining solution using Nash (1950).s Scale Invariance (SI) axiom and an axiom named Suppes-Sen Proofness (SSP) that embodies the Suppes-Sen principle. By...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008474120
I characterize the proportional N-person bargaining solutions by individual rationality, translation invariance, feasible set continuity, and a new axiom - interim improvement. The latter says that if the disagreement point d is known, but the feasible set is not - it may be either S or T, where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009324196
In this paper we make use of a unique dataset collected in the central train station of Kiel, Germany. A group ticket is used by individual proposers who search for co-travelers to share the ride with shortly before the train departure. The bargaining behavior resembles the Ultimatum game to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271417
We consider a situation where groups negotiate over the allocation of a surplus (which is used to fund group specific goods). Each group is composed of agents who have differing valuations for public goods. Members choose a representative to take decisions on their behalf. Specifically,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272404
This paper models the instability of peace agreements, motivated by the empirical regularity with which peace agreements tend to break down following civil war. When war provides opportunities for profit to one side, or when other difficulties such as historical grievances exist, peace may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273402
We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability-generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer-term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and does not generate short-term gains. In equilibrium,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536977
Typically, economics assumes that property rights over productive resources or goods are perfectly defined and costlessly enforced. The costs of insecurity and the resultant conflict are, however, real and often economically significant. In this paper, we examine how international trade regimes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013470292
We consider a dynamic setting in which two sovereign states with overlapping ownership claims on a resource/asset first arm and then choose whether to resolve their dispute violently through war or peacefully through settlement. Both approaches depend on the states' military capacities, but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013470299