We show that even under incomplete markets, the equilibrium manifold identifies aggregate demand and individual demands everywhere in their domains. Moreover, under partial observation of the equilibrium manifold, we we construct maximal domains of identification. For this, we assume conditions...

We offer a new proof that the equilibrium manifold (under complete markets) identifies individual demands globally. Moreover, under observation of only a subset of the equilibrium manifold, we find domains on which aggregate and individual demands are identifiable. Our argument avoids the...

Durante las últimas décadas, el mecanismo de subastas ha ganado enorme popularidad como herramienta de asignación de recursos y preponderancia como agenda de investigación académica. En particular, considerando las diferentes alternativas de diseño de una subasta, se han estudiado sus...

We show that, even under incomplete markets, the equilibrium manifold identifies individual demands everywhere in their domains. For this, we assume conditions of smoothness, interiority and regularity, and avoid observational requirements at the individual level. It is crucial that there be...

This paper provides first order conditions for a very general class of single or multi-unit auctions. Under mild conditions we characterize bidding-behavior and generalize previous standard results in the literature. As an application we obtain sufficient conditions for truth-telling, monotonic...

Este trabajo utiliza la Ley de Newcomb-Benford y las pruebas de Beber y Scacco para analizar las elecciones presidenciales desde 1958 hasta el 2006, las presidenciales de 1922, las elecciones de Congreso en 2010, y las votaciones para Alcalde en Cali del 2007. Este es el primer estudio y...