This paper focuses on indivisible "multiple-cost-single-benefit " projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the...

In this paper we study the endogenous determination of bureaucratic friction in a bureaucratic contest with (<InlineEquation ID="Equ1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX"><![CDATA[$n \ge 2$]]></EquationSource> </InlineEquation>) and without (n=1) rent contestability. When n= 1 bureaucratic impediments induce the individual to undertake rent-securing activities at the same level as in the two-player...</equationsource></inlineequation>

Rich countries often face sizeable illegal migration. This paper suggests that these countries would use the financial aid which they give to the source countries as an instrument to prevent illegal immigration. The core of this policy is to allow the source countries to compete for the...