We propose a dynamic version of the standard two-party electoral competition model adapted to nonlinear income taxation. The theory has a number of desirable features. First, equilibria always exist, even though the set of admissible tax policies is multidimensional. Second, the Nash set can be...

Suppose that (X,A) is a measurable space and Y is a metrizable, Souslin space. Let Au denote the universal completion of A. Given f : X x Y !R and x 2 X, let f (x,xc) be the lower semicontinuous hull of f (x,xc). If f is (Au B(Y),B(R))-measurable, then f is (Au B(Y),B(R))-measurable.

We prove the existence of a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium within a class of compact, metric, and possibly discontinuous games. Our conditions for existence are easily verified in a variety of economic games.