anonymous, such markets perform poorly: sellers are not trustworthy, and buyers do not trust sellers. If sellers are …, we find that competition, coupled with some minimal information, eliminates the trust problem almost completely. …

anonymous, such markets perform poorly: sellers are not trustworthy, and buyers do not trust sellers. If sellers are …, we find that competition, coupled with some minimal information, eliminates the trust problem almost completely. …

Arguing that consumers are the carriers of firms’ reputations, we examine the role of consumer networks for trust in …' incentives for reputation building and, thus, enhances trust and efficiency in markets. This efficiency-enhancing effect is …

We study the effects of reputation and competition in a trust game. If trustees are anonymous, outcomes are poor …: trustees are not trustworthy, and trustors do not trust. If trustees are identifiable and can, hence, build a reputation … minimal information, eliminates the trust problem almost completely. …

Arguing that consumers are the carriers of firms’ reputations, we examine the role of consumer networks for trust in …' incentives for reputation building and, thus, enhances trust and efficiency in markets. This efficiency-enhancing effect is …

anonymous, such markets perform poorly: sellers are not trustworthy, and buyers do not trust sellers. If sellers are …, we find that competition, coupled with some minimal information, eliminates the trust problem almost completely …