Training for skills that are transferable to other firms, but for which the external labor market is imperfectly competitive, cannot be analyzed using the traditional tools of general and specific training. It is known that firms (as well as workers) have an incentive to invest in such training...

Two sources of inefficiency in the provision of on-the-job training are examined: an externality between firms which arises if there is imperfect competition between firms in the labor market, and allocation inefficiency due to asymmetry of information about the value of the trained worker. The...

This paper explores the incentives faced by employers for supplying general training of the type given to craft apprentices. An investment model is developed in which the employer's return takes the form of reduced recruitment costs for skilled labor. An empirical model is derived and fitted to...

This article investigates the hypothesis that when measures of specific human capital (such as job tenure) are included in earnings functions, there may be a sample selection bias because of job-matching effectsbecause workers with high unobserved match quality receive and accept high wage...

A number of recent papers have found that certain measures of pollution worsen and later improve as income per head increases. It is widely believed that the downhill portion of this inverted-U curve reflects an induced policy response; that, as incomes rise, citizens demand improvements in...