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Hidden symmetries and focal points
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Kuzmics, Christoph - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 1, pp. 226-258
games. The information provided by a frame is captured by a symmetry structure which is consistent with the payoff structure … of the game. The set of symmetry structures has itself a clear structure (a lattice). Focal points are strategy profiles … which respect the symmetry structure and are chosen according to some meta-norm, which is not particular to the framed game …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042988
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Symmetric play in repeated allocation games
Kuzmics, Christoph; Palfrey, Thomas; Rogers, Brian W. - 2012
We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while the use of symmetric strategy profiles essentially does not restrict the set of feasible payoffs, the set of equilibrium payoffs is an interesting proper subset of the feasible and individually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352851
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Symmetric play in repeated allocation games
Kuzmics, Christoph; Palfrey, Thomas; Rogers, Brian W. - 2012
We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while the use of symmetric strategy profiles essentially does not restrict the set of feasible payoffs, the set of equilibrium payoffs is an interesting proper subset of the feasible and individually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319965
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Symmetric play in repeated allocation games
Kuzmics, Christoph; Palfrey, Thomas R.; Rogers, Brian W. - In: Journal of economic theory 154 (2014), pp. 25-67
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010480437
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Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices
Andonie, Costel; Kuzmics, Christoph - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 84 (2012) 2, pp. 681-700
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009703231
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Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices
Andonie, Costel; Kuzmics, Christoph - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 84 (2012) 2, pp. 681-700
In the unique attainable equilibrium of a voting model with one minority candidate and two similarly appealing majority candidates, majority voters are unable to coordinate their support and the minority candidate (Condorcet loser) is elected. Suppose a random sample of voters is asked about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594584
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Symmetric play in repeated allocation games
Kuzmics, Christoph; Palfrey, Thomas; Rogers, Brian W. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 154 (2014) C, pp. 25-67
We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while the use of symmetric strategy profiles essentially does not restrict the set of feasible payoffs, the set of equilibrium payoffs is an interesting proper subset of the feasible and individually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076682
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Symmetric play in repeated allocation games
Kuzmics, Christoph; Palfrey, Thomas; Rogers, Brian - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2012
We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while the use of symmetric strategy profiles essentially does not restrict the set of feasible payoffs, the set of equilibrium payoffs is an interesting proper subset of the feasible and individually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010568484
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On the Strategic Use of Focal Points in Bargaining Situations
Janssen, Maarten C.W. - 2006
. This paper uses symmetry requirements to formalize the notion of focal points. By doing so, it explains the focality of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325271
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Feature-based choice and similarity in normal-form games: An experimental study
Devetag, Giovanna; Di Guida, Sibilla - 2010
In this paper we test the effect of descriptive features on initial strategic behavior in normal form games, where descriptive are all those features that can be modified without altering the (Nash) equilibrium structure of a game. We observe that our experimental subjects behave according to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328360