We study a simple contracting game with a principal and two agents. Contracts exert an externalities on non contractors …

environmental externalities such as pollution. We argue that consumer contracts generate externalities by overwhelming consumers … contracts would impose on consumers. This would force sellers to internalize these costs and incentivize them to invest in …, and comprehension rates would rise. To further penalize inefficient contracts while reducing the tax burden on efficient …

standard-setting with two means of interventionist harmonization: through centralization and through allocation of lawmaking … cross-jurisdictional externalities, harmonization is, contrary to conventional predictions, not desirable when local …

standard-setting with two means of interventionist harmonization: through centralization and through allocation of lawmaking … cross-jurisdictional externalities, harmonization is, contrary to conventional predictions, not desirable when local …

principal can benefit from such delegation relative to centralization. We show that beneficial delegation is possible when … complete contracts cannot be written, and delegation of authority should necessarily be to the information gatherer. The benets … of delegation stem from either efficiency gains or reduction in rent to the information gatherer. …

principal can benefit from such delegation relative to centralization. We show that beneficial delegation is possible when … complete contracts cannot be written, and delegation of authority should necessarily be to the information gatherer. The … benefits of delegation stem from either efficiency gains or reduction in rent to the information gatherer. …

two two-tier hierarchies, the principal designs contracts for both agents. In delegation with a three-tier hierarchy, the …-a-vis centralization, document comparative statics results regarding the benefits of delegation and the distribution of total surplus, and … discuss when delegation is more likely to dominate centralization …

with other employees. We study when such delegation can be optimal. In centralization, the owner retains the authority … the benefits of delegation and discuss when delegation is more likely to dominate centralization. … incentive provision to the worker. Beneficial delegation should necessarily motivate the manager to acquire information, which …

two two-tier hierarchies, the principal designs contracts for both agents. In delegation with a three-tier hierarchy, the …-爿vis centralization, document comparative statics results regarding the benefits of delegation and the distribution of total surplus, and … discuss when delegation is more likely to dominate centralization. …